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ABSTRACT
Debates over value in health innovation in the U.S. and Europe have
become increasingly dominated by “value-based pricing”. We exam-
ine this prevailing narrative and its weaknesses and then present an
alternative framework for rethinking value in health. Drawing on
scholarship from the political economy of innovation, we argue that
value in health must be considered in terms of both value creation
as a collective process amongst public and private actors, as well as
value extraction that occurs due to ﬁnancialization. In building this
alternative framework, we pose three questions that present areas
for further research and public policy change.
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Policy Highlights
● Prices of drugs should be better aligned to the actual risk sharing between public
and private actors, rather than myths around value created by a narrow set of
actors.
● Policy can be used to steer public purpose missions in health – not only to de-risk
private costs.
● Markets are outcomes of public and private investments, hence health innovation
policy should be seen not as “regulating” or intervening but as actively co-shaping
markets.
1. Introduction
In response to an intensifying debate in the summer of 2015 over Gilead Science’s price for
new curative medicines for hepatitis C – launched in the United States at over $80,000 – the
company’s senior executive Gregg Alton responded, “price is the wrong discussion”. Instead,
he argued, “value should be the subject.”1 In Alton’s narrative of value, Gilead’s medicines are
curing patients of an infectious disease at a far higher rate than prior medicines and averting
the downstream expenses of liver transplants and hospitalizations incurred by health systems
from untreated disease progression. In his view, the price reﬂected the value of the therapies
for patients and health systems. Alton is not alone; this conception of value has gained wider
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currency in U.S. and European policy debates over pricing and access to new technologies for
health (Bach and Pearson 2015; Gregson et al. 2005).
Scholarship on value in health has tended to be dominated by cost-beneﬁt analysis, in
which value is quantiﬁed and represented by comparing the prices and clinical beneﬁts of
competing health technologies for a given disease (that is, value-based pricing). In this
paper we question the concept of “value” that has been accepted in the health sector in
Europe and the U.S. and propose an alternative framework that builds on perspectives from
the political economy of innovation and pragmatic philosophies of public value to build a
wider andmore dynamic account of value (Bozeman 2007;Mazzucato 2016b).We focus on
health innovation, deﬁning innovation as changes that allow higher-quality products at
competitive cost to emerge and be diﬀused (Lazonick and Mazzucato 2013). Within the
innovation process, we diﬀerentiate between the sources and directions of value creation at
diﬀerent stages in the value chain (including diﬀusion), and the links with particular
mechanisms of value extraction. Our account addresses several of the main problems
with searching for value solely through the cost-beneﬁt lens, with escalating drug prices
and the recurring conundrum of “me-too” drugs being two symptoms of prevailing
narratives of value.
Rather than deﬁning value in terms of the comparative cost-beneﬁt ratios of competing
therapies, we locate value in three fundamental questions related to the innovation process:
(1) CREATION: How does value creation happen across multiple stages and actors (that is,
division of innovative labor) (Arora and Gambardella 1994)?; (2) DIRECTION: What are
the diﬀerent directions that health innovation can take (Stirling 2007; Abraham 2010); (3)
REWARDS: How are the risks and rewards of innovation shared and distributed
(Mazzucato 2013; Mazzucato, 2016a)? We bring these three questions together to build a
diﬀerent notion of value in which value is viewed as a product of strategic deliberation and
collective investment between multiple actors – where both the rate and direction of value
creation is contestable rather than seen as determined by “market forces”. In this context,
we viewmarkets in health as outcomes of the investments between public, private and third
sector organisations, so that policy is not about “ﬁxing market failures”, but involves
actively shaping and co-creating value and innovation.
Recognizing that directionality is not an inevitable outcome left to markets, but a
contestable question amongst multiple actors, we take a normative view on how
directions can be set through “missions” that can meet societal needs, such as healthy
aging, antibiotic resistance, obesity and diabetes, cancer, and epidemic prevention
(Mazzucato 2018). We also examine the role of the public sector in making the
necessary risk-taking investments to pursue those directions along with the private
sector and governing the distribution of risks and rewards to ensure sustainable and
equitable outcomes. Our aim is to provoke a discussion that broadens our under-
standing of value in health innovation and enables new public policy directions.
We begin in section two by documenting the narratives used to discuss value in health
economics and the assumptions upon which these narratives are based. In section three, we
demystify these assumptions by pointing the out the key pitfalls of these prevailing
narratives. To build an alternative view of value, we build on diﬀerent political economic
perspectives in section four to pose the key questions and possibilities for reimagining
value. We conclude with some directions for further inquiry and policy entrepreneurship.
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2. Narratives of pricing and value in health innovation: costs of R&D and
“value-based pricing”
In bringing new products to health systems, large, incumbent pharmaceutical compa-
nies have increasingly begun to make arguments of “value-based pricing” to govern-
ments and health systems.2 The pharmaceutical industry had traditionally opposed
public assessments of the value of new therapies, viewing them as a form of government
pricing regulation (Scannell 2016). Instead, the industry has argued its prices were
based on the “costs of research and development”, with patented protected monopoly
pricing viewed as necessary to pay for the lengthy and failure-ridden process involved
in successfully bringing a therapy to market (DiMasi et al. 1991, 2016). The industry-
supported Tufts Center for Drug Development has produced periodic studies illustrat-
ing the escalating costs of research and development, arriving at a ﬁgure of US$2.6
billion per newly approved molecule in 2015 (DiMasi 2003, 2016). However, the Tufts
ﬁgures have been criticized on numerous grounds, such as the lack of transparency
about what is counted as part of a company’s research and development costs as well as
the inclusion of “opportunity costs” (via cost of capital) accounting for nearly half of
the estimated totals (Light and Warburton 2011; Avorn 2015).3 As the evidence behind
this view has faced mounting criticism and prices appear to be uncoupling from
research and development investments made by companies (for reasons we discuss in
the following section), the industry has turned to a new narrative to justify the prices of
new medicines: value.
More than a decade ago, health industry consultants described this shift towards a
“value-based pricing strategy” as follows: “in essence, the fundamental pricing question has
shifted from ‘what price do we need to charge to cover our costs and make a good return?’
to ‘given market perceptions of value, which products can we proﬁtability produce?’”
(Gregson et al. 2005). One way of understanding the “market perceptions of value” is to
set prices that fall within the thresholds signaled by health systems. However, with health
systems facing signiﬁcant budgetary pressures with highly priced products (such as new
cancer, cholesterol, and hepatitis C medicines) that might also beneﬁt larger populations
(not just for rare diseases), manufacturers are also turning to a second method of valuing
therapeutic innovation: quantifying the “prevention value” of new medicines.
This value-based pricing narrative of value has gained traction among multiple stake-
holders in U.S. and Europe. In the United States, for example, pharmaceutical lobbying group
PhRMAhas developed “TheValue Collaborative” as a new research andmarketing campaign
to demonstrate “the value of innovation”, purported to be developed by the industry onwhose
behalf they lobby. Policy-makers in Europe are exploring ways to reﬁne value assessment
already used in pricing negotiations with companies while a new U.S. organization ICER
(Institute for Clinical and Economic Review) is working to help health systems there adopt
similar approaches (Bach and Pearson 2015; Claxton et al. 2008). Physicians, patient groups,
and public health agencies also use this version of the value narrative to engage in debates over
resource allocation and treatment access (Rein et al. 2015;VanNuys et al. 2015).However, this
road carries perils that have yet to be fully elaborated – a task towhichwe turn in the following
section.
The prevailing value narrative for health innovation can be summed up as “higher prices
represent the value of health improvements.” This narrative relies on an alluring logic: that
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“consumers” are willing to pay more for better health outcomes, and that this payment will
direct innovation toward producing more “high-value” therapies. In the case of health,
however, the consumers are not individual patients. Because the prices of patent-protected
medicines aremultiples above themedianwages of individuals, the responsibility to “value”
new medicines falls on the ultimate buyers: public health systems (Reinhardt 2015).
From the perspective of health system leaders facing rising health care costs and
budgetary pressures, deliberations about the realization of “value” have come increas-
ingly to the foreground over the past two decades (Claxton et al. 2008; Gregson et al.
2005). From the perspective of manufacturers aiming to grow proﬁts, public delibera-
tions about value are said to reveal the preferences of health systems, thereby enabling
companies to set prices and investments accordingly. Drawing on the relatively young
ﬁeld of health economics, this value is quantiﬁed and evaluated largely based on two
metrics: cost-eﬀectiveness and prevention. Before identifying the pitfalls of using this
mode of assessment to represent value, we describe these two metrics in turn.
2.1 Cost-eﬀectiveness as value
To assess whether and how much to pay for new health technologies, health systems have
increasingly used what is called cost-eﬀectiveness research in health economics – with
manufacturers in turn aiming to set their prices in alignment with these assessments.
Such research involves comparing the costs and beneﬁts of two therapies, such as a new
therapy against a competing standard of care, to see whether the beneﬁts (if any) can be
generated under a certain monetary level called the “value threshold”. This research links
prices of new technologies to units of health improvements called “quality-adjusted life
years” (QALYs), with health systems being willing to pay for medicines that generate an
additional QALY for patients under the upward limits of the value threshold.
For example, the United Kingdom’s National Institutes for Clinical Excellence (NICE)
has set a threshold of £30,000 per QALY as what the NHS is willing to pay for new
technologies (McCabe, Claxton, and Culyer 2008). In other words, the NHS believes it
creates an additional quality life year in the English population for each £30,000 it spends
on a given new technology. In theory, “cost-eﬀectiveness” – as pegged to QALYs – is a
measure of opportunity costs and cost eﬃciency for health systems, with the notion that
new health technologies must oﬀer greater beneﬁts than the programs and technologies
that are displaced by funding the new technology (Badano, Junghans, and Johns 2017). This
measure is supposed to provide health systems with conﬁdence that they are getting value
for money, while also providing an incentive for the pharmaceutical industry to bring new
drugs to market that demonstrate health improvement over existing options.
2.2 Prevention as value
In this orientation to value, health technologies are priced not only based on their cost-
eﬀectiveness compared to existing options, but also based on the health savings and
economic beneﬁts that early treatment may bring society. With therapeutic innovation
that can modify the trajectory of pathology (for example, lipid-lowering agents that can
prevent heart attacks, or hepatitis C antivirals that can prevent liver cirrhosis) if taken
early in a disease course, manufacturers argue that innovation saves health systems
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downstream costs that might otherwise be incurred while also creating spillover eﬀects
in the overall economy (Dumit 2012; Maldonado Castañeda 2016).
Such a view can be found in the marketing materials produced by the industry. A
fact sheet produced by PhRMA claims that, “every additional dollar spent on medicines
or adherent patients with congestive heart failure, high blood pressure, diabetes and
high cholesterol generated $3 to $10 in savings on emergency room visits and in patient
hospitalizations” and that “a 10 percent decrease in the cancer death rate is worth
roughly $4.4 trillion in economic value to current and future generations” (Zirkelbach
2015). PhRMA argues that paying for high priced medicines today creates future-
oriented value for society. Health economic studies quantify this prevention value by
measuring two quantities at the level of populations: the total amount of health savings
that early treatment yields to health systems, and the total economic value of overall
health improvements that this early treatment creates. As health systems and the public
weigh drug prices, companies argue that this “value as prevention” should bear into
resource allocation.
3. Value as value-based pricing? Demystifying the prevailing narrative
Taken together, cost-eﬀectiveness and prevention value research is used to represent the
value of health innovation in debates over pricing and drug development.
Methodologically, these approaches are fraught with vexing questions, such as what
monetary value to impute to a QALY (Knapp and Mangalore 2011; Neumann and
Cohen 2014; Nord, Daniels, and Kamlet 2009). This paper does not delve into the
methodological pitfalls of value-based pricing, but rather unpacks the conceptual under-
pinnings of the narrative of value in which a confounding logic – the higher the price,
the higher the value of the medicine – seemingly becomes normalized. In other words, if
people are willing to pay a high price, then the therapy must be valuable. Such a logic is
exemplary of Neoclassical economics whereby it is price that determines value not vice
versa, as it was in Classical economic theory (Mazzucato 2018). By taking a static
conception of value based largely on cost-beneﬁt analyses – divorced from the struc-
tural conditions of production – in which the price of comparative clinical improve-
ments is deemed commensurate with value, the prevailing narrative fails to consider the
dynamic nature by which value is created and distributed in the health innovation
process. Before pointing towards alternative directions, the next section unpacks four
key problems with value-based pricing that challenge the very underpinnings of the
conventional wisdom on value in health innovation.
3.1. Problem #1: monopoly and demand inelasticity means prices are ‘what
society can bear’4
The value-based pricing narrative misses the most basic economic reason for higher
prices for new health technologies: publicly granted monopoly protections for manu-
facturers combined with rigid demand elasticity for medicines. New medicines are
covered by patents. Therefore, operating as monopolists in a given therapeutic area,
manufacturers can set prices unrestrained by competition. With many goods, the
elasticity of demand would be a constraint based on simple supply and demand logics:
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the higher the price, the lower the demand for the monopolists’ product. Of course, the
elasticity of demand for medicines is quite diﬀerent: people’s health is at stake. This
rigidity of demand elasticity means that public and private insurers often bear high
prices in order to meet their obligations to patients and their livelihoods. Rather than
reﬂecting value, higher prices are a manifestation of “what society can bear” in the face
of monopoly power.
Under this conﬁguration, manufacturers are not merely accruing a share of the
total social value created through health innovation; they are accumulating sizeable
rents, or unearned income, through the period of patent protections. This basic
feature – of monopoly combined with demand inelasticity – is a major reason why
the pharmaceutical industry has the highest proﬁt margins of any sector, surpass-
ing even the energy and banking sectors. Our concern here is less with the
existence of rent, but what happens with this accumulation.5 As we describe in
problem #4, rather than being reinvested in innovation and value creation, a
signiﬁcant share of this rent is directed towards shareholder extraction in the
form of stock repurchases.
3.2 Problem #2: the structure of ﬁnancial market expectations leads to spiraling
drug prices that distort value-based assessments
The monopoly dimension of health innovation is grafted onto a second dimension: the
ﬁnancial environments in which these monopolists operate. Large publicly traded
Figure 1. Price increases for each generation of hepatitis C therapies.
Caption: each generation of improved therapies, indicated by increases in sustained virologic response (SVR, from left
to right along x-axis), has been coupled to increases in prices. Medicines with increasing prices and budgetary
consequences can still appear cost-eﬀective in such comparisons. This pricing data is speciﬁcally from the Swiss
case, but is similar across U.S. and European contexts. Source: Vernaz et al. (2016).
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biopharmaceutical companies are valued on stock markets that are not based on their
proﬁts, but on the anticipation of growth in proﬁts over time. This expectation of near-
term and continual growth, signaled through share price, has become the core metric by
which shareholders evaluate a company’s performance (Birch 2016). Because growth
through new product development in health innovation takes many years, companies
turn to another vehicle to generate growth: price increases, both on an annualized basis
for already approved drugs and also in bringing new therapies to market (Glabau 2016).
Higher prices for new therapies (compared to the standard of care that may be
replaced) signal, for example, the potential for earnings growth – thereby serving as a
driver for a company’s share price.
This creates an escalator phenomenon for drug prices, with each price setting the
ﬂoor for the next price. When such prices exist for drugs with small potential patient
populations, health systems can often plan for increases in health spending. But when
such prices apply to drugs with large numbers of potential beneﬁciaries, health systems
face a much steeper challenge in coping with the escalation in expenses. Take the
example of hepatitis C, for which each new generation of treatments since the 1980s has
involved a signiﬁcant price leap (see Figure 1 from the previous generation (Vernaz
et al. 2016). Even though the latest curative therapies had “value-based prices”, the large
numbers of patients meant that health systems had to choose to either allocate sig-
niﬁcant new spending for the medicines or restrict access to treatment
As one group of cancer doctors put it, this mode of assessment “allows a BMW to
look like a bargain when the only other car on the lot is a Ferrari” (Bach, Giralt, and
Saltz 2017). A price for a new health technology may be deemed to be cost-eﬀective
compared to a prior option, but the price of the prior option may already have been
quite high. In analyzing cancer drugs, health policy scholar Peter Bach (2015) observed:
“expensive drugs can still seem deceptively cost-eﬀective, because of the long upward
spiral we have seen in the prices of cancer treatments”. In this context, rather than
reﬂecting value as conceived of in the conventional narrative, prices are instead artifacts
of ﬁnancial market expectations that are used to maximize short-term growth.
This focus on near-term growth means that health systems are supposed to “buy
health now” in return for savings in the future. Yet this logic suﬀers from a serious
limitation: these “savings” are a mirage. As the doctor and epidemiologist most credited
for advancing preventative medicine Geoﬀrey Rose (2008) has noted, using clinical
interventions to prevent disease cannot be defended on purely economic grounds. Rose
pointed out that the longer one lives, the more treatments one tends to require. In the
instance of highly priced medicines, states would inevitably need to spend this money
on other areas of social and health concern; furthermore, the large-scale costs of using
these breakthrough medicines in the present (unlike more aﬀordable medicines like
vaccines) could in many cases dwarf any future savings (see Van Nuys et al. 2015 as an
example from hepatitis C). The main grounds on which to use medicines to prevent
disease then is a humanitarian one – more life with less disease; yet this humanitarian
beneﬁt is threatened by an adoption of “value-based assessments” that do not consider
rising prices over time and their impact on access to treatment.
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3.3 Problem #3: value-based pricing does not account for the role of an
entrepreneurial state in value creation
A third major problem is the failure to see innovation as a cumulative and collective
outcome, in which value creation occurs through multiple actors taking risks for the
sake of uncertain rewards. In this context, health innovation requires long-term risk-
taking – and a major source of this patient capital comes not from manufacturers
(which operate in short-term-oriented stock markets), but from investments by an
entrepreneurial state (Mazzucato 2013). The existing value narrative renders these
investments largely invisible, or merely as public goods to be taken for granted in the
innovation process. In the US, however, public investment from the National Institutes
of Health (NIH) amounted to $804 billion between 1934 and 2015 (Lazonick and
Mazzucato 2013). Although public investment is often depicted only as an input to
“basic science”, the NIH has gone beyond early-stage science to directly fund the
research tools that create new markets for later private investment (such as the
emergence of the biotechnology sector in the 1980s), as well as provide direct funding
to start-ups through the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program at their
riskiest stages of development (Keller and Block 2013; Stevens et al. 2011).
In many major therapeutic advances, an entrepreneurial state has made vital con-
tributions over many decades and taken risks across the innovation chain, from basic
and “translational” science to clinical trials (Mazzucato 2013). For example, an inves-
tigation by Cleary et al. (2018) showed that NIH ﬁnanced research was associated with
every one of the 210 drugs approved by the FDA between 2010–2016, collectively
accounting for >200,000 years of grant funding totaling more than $100 billion.
Other studies have illustrated the contribution of public investment to an array of
breakthrough therapies (Angell 2004; Goozner 2005; Sampat and Lichtenberg 2011).
Because these investments are not considered in the conventional value narrative, the
sources of value creation are not considered in the innovation process. For example, the
NIH does not take a stake in the start-ups that it funds, and it typically earns a low level
of royalties given the extent of its investments. Other US government agencies that
invest in health innovation, such as the Veterans Aﬀairs, are even more poorly posi-
tioned (Flier 2016). The UK government, one of the world’s leading funders of
biomedical research, also suﬀers from a similar posture (Dzintars et al. 2017).
Furthermore, price negotiations between manufacturers and public payers do not
reﬂect the investments made by the public – creating the phenomenon of the public
“paying twice”: both for pivotal research as well as for high-priced medicines.
3.4 Problem #4: value-based pricing masks signiﬁcant value extraction and
ﬁnancialization
In addition to lacking a theory of value creation, the existing narrative also fails to
account for the value extraction that occurs in the innovation process for new health
technologies. The biopharmaceutical industry has long argued that monopoly rent,
enabled through patents, is necessary to ﬁnance further value creation.6 However,
evidence from the pharmaceutical sector over the past decade runs counter to this
claim. Rather than reinvest accumulated capital into further innovation, companies are
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increasingly turning to ﬁnancial maneuvers to boost share price. One of the most
common such maneuvers is the share buyback, in which companies buy back their
own shares to boost the value of the remaining ones to shareholders in equity markets
(Lazonick et al. 2016). From 2005 to 2014, for example, the 19 pharmaceutical compa-
nies in the S&P 500 Index spent $226 billion repurchasing their own shares, equivalent
to 51 percent of their combined research and development expenditures over this
period.7 Thus, signiﬁcant shares of monopoly rent from the sector have gone towards
shareholders in the form of buybacks in the name of “maximizing shareholder value.”
However, the theory of maximizing shareholder value is ultimately a strategy of value
extraction that lacks a theory of value creation (Lazonick 2015). The dominant aim of
executives of publicly traded biopharmaceutical companies is to generate accumulation
for shareholders within near-term time horizons. Any investments that may put this
aim at risk – such as long-term and early-stage scientiﬁc research – are to be eschewed,
with surplus capital instead directed to shareholders who are held in legal and neo-
classical economic theory to be the sole claimants on any “residual earnings” (Stout
2013). Unlike managers, workers and contractors, shareholders are held to be the only
actors that take risks in the innovation process without certainty of return (such as a
salary or contractual payment).
And yet shareholders of large pharmaceutical companies seldom risk signiﬁcant capital
in the innovation process; rather, they trade on stock price to generate capital gains
(Lazonick 2015; Stout 2013). For these companies, accumulated sales from high-priced
drugs are the primary source of risk capital, which is spent primarily on late-stage
clinical trials, acquisitions, and share buybacks. In this way, value-based pricing can be
observed as a way of normalizing signiﬁcant amounts of value extraction in which
rewards are accrued to the ﬁnancial actors (that is, shareholders of large pharmaceutical
companies) that have taken the least risks in the innovation process.
In sum, the current narrative on value has signiﬁcant limitations. Value is conﬁned
to a measure of cost-beneﬁt utility that obscures the inﬂuence of monopoly, ﬁnancial
markets, and value extraction in the innovation process, and renders pivotal sources of
value creation – such as the state – invisible. In a critique of this narrative, biotech
venture capitalist Jack Scannell stated simply: “value-based pricing evolved as a way of
charging customers more” (Scannell 2016). Through the methodologies of quantifying
cost-eﬀectiveness and prevention value, however, value-based pricing has become a
powerful narrative catering to the ﬁnancial interests of shareholders while appearing to
align with the vital goals of health systems.
4. Directions, divisions of labor, and distributions of risks and rewards:
towards a framework of public value
A diﬀerent account of value must thus go beyond a narrowing assessment of cost-beneﬁt
analysis of individual drugs. Such an evaluation requires, in the ﬁrst instance, a departure
from the market failure theory that dominates economic thinking, in which the role of the
state is seen as merely addressing diﬀerent types of market failures such as those that arise
from negative externalities (such as regulating pollution), positive externalities (for exam-
ple, those arising from public goods like clean air or basic science), or information
asymmetries (such as those that prevent small ﬁrms from receiving the loans they require).
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However, this perspective ignores how markets are actually outcomes of diﬀerent invest-
ments, including those of the entrepreneurial state (described above), which have often
gone beyond ﬁxing positive and negative externalities, actively co-shaping and co-creating
markets (Mazzucato 2016a). To relate this viewpoint to the area of health, it is necessary to
reimagine such deliberations beyond value-based pricing and develop a theory of public
value.
As Bozeman and Sarewitz (2005) have described, conventional market failure theory in
neoclassical economics has come at the cost of considering whether, even in cases ofmarket
successes, there has been a failure to meet some essential public values. In contrast to
market failure theory, public failures are situations where “neither themarket nor the public
sector provides goods and services required to achieve core public values” (Bozeman
2007).8 In contrast to the market failure model, Bozeman 2007 argues, “a public failure
approach changes the discussion of public policy by making government (and public
values) something other than a residual category or an issue of technical eﬃciency in
pricing structures”.
As we have highlighted here, public organizations have long played pivotal roles beyond
ﬁxing markets. The investments in research and development, protection of knowledge
property, and government payments for medicines that now create markets and enable
private capital investments means that the value of health innovation is fundamentally
shaped by an array of choices in which the public plays a market-shaping role (Mazzucato
2017). Yet these public roles are often rendered invisible, with the deliberations necessary
for making choices about public value left to private actors.
It is necessary to go beyond the failure narrative where public deliberations are
primarily in response to some absence, problem, or social crisis. To do this, we draw on
insights from the political economy of innovation to consider a new way of thinking
about value in terms collective value creation. From this vantage point, the central areas
of deliberation and strategy for health innovation involve the directions for possible
trajectories of innovation, the divisions of labor between public and private actors in the
innovation process, and the distribution of risks and rewards of innovation. In con-
sidering these questions, cost-beneﬁt tools used by governments to make and imple-
ment decisions are simply insuﬃcient, as the core aims of the innovation process for
health – such as genuine therapeutic advances and access to these advances – hang in
the balance. Rather than reducing these aims (and the overall discussion on value) to a
price mechanism that does not capture the social nature of health innovation, con-
sideration of these questions can open previously closed pathways for health and
innovation.
4.1 Directions: meeting unmet patient and public health needs
A critical determinant of value creation in innovation is understanding that innovation not
only has a rate (or pace), but also a direction, in which new products, markets, and services
are used to address societal challenges (Mazzucato 2016a, 2017).Throughout history, public-
sector organizations have played a pivotal role in shaping these directions for innovation;
techno-economic paradigms did not emerge spontaneously from market forces. Mass
production and the IT revolution are two examples where governments made direct
investments in technologies and then formulated bold policies that allowed these
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technologies to be fully deployed throughout the economy. In the alternative view, where
public investments are viewed merely as ﬁxing market failures (such as basic research),
market forces are believed to eﬃciently direct the economy to a path of growth and
development. Yet, as Dosi (1982) argued, markets are “blind”, with the direction of change
provided by markets often creating suboptimal outcomes from a societal point of view.
In the domain of health, the key question is what is the purpose of innovation in health?
A common-sense answer would be: to address unmet health needs for patients and popula-
tions, from rare diseases to public health threats. However, the market failure view has not
been useful for guiding investments to achieve these objectives. Even as public investment
has enabled the creation of entirely new socio-technical paradigms, such as genomic science
and biotechnology, the terrain of product development, pricing, and access have been
largely left for private industry to dictate. This division of labor has had three consequences.
First, as Gary Pisano (2006) described in Science Business, many of the promises of
biotechnology have not been fully translated into clinical advances. As Pisano demon-
strated through an analysis of the history of the sector, the short-term-oriented venture
and equity market ﬁnancing for biotechnology has been ill-equipped to deliver the
long-term, patient ﬁnancing needed for the risk-laden and failure-ridden nature of
scientiﬁc and clinical research (Pisano 2006). In other words, because ﬁnance itself is
not neutral, the sources of ﬁnance aﬀect the directions of what is ﬁnanced (Mazzucato
and Semieniuk 2017 ).
Second, in the absence of directionality in public policy, industry players have more
readily captured regulatory pathways to meet near-term ﬁnancial targets through the
proliferation of me-too drugs and incremental advances – this is part of the “pharmaceu-
ticalization” of health (Abraham 2010). By contrast, setting directions through purpose-led
missions (detailed in the next section) would involve addressing unmet areas of patient and
public health need in need of radical innovation, from diseases of aging and cognition, to
curative cancer therapies, to infectious diseases (such as antibiotics, vaccines for epidemic
viruses).
Third, even in cases where therapeutic advances have been made (in many cases with
public investment enabling the technological breakthroughs underpinning therapeutic
advances), monopoly pricing (now guised in the value-based discourse) has under-
mined the realization of optimal patient and public health outcomes – a crucial
directional outcome of interest from innovation for health.
On the other hand, understanding directionality as a dimension of value in health
innovation can embolden public sector organizations and foster more symbiotic interac-
tions between public and private actors to tackle societal health challenges. As Stirling has
documented, directions can be deliberative outcomes of the state, together with other
stakeholders, and can help deﬁne “what ‘winning’ even means” (Stirling 2009, 2).9 In the
space of health, winning may not simply be more drugs, but new kinds of therapeutic,
diagnostic, and surgical interventions, as well as the realization of public health targets.
4.2 Divisions of innovative labor: value creation as a dynamic, collective process
Another fundamental question related to value in health innovation is: What is the division
of innovative labor that will best produce the desired outcomes? As described in
Gambardella (1995) and Arora and Gambardella (1994), innovation occurs through a
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division of labor among the state, business, and intermediary organizations. A critical
question is how to structure this division of labor across an innovation process in ways that
make use of the expertise of each type of actor, but also create opportunities for learning
and serendipity that may only occur through overlapping roles. Arora et al. (2015) used a
large array of scientiﬁc publishing data to argue that the increasing specialization of labor
(with large corporations taking on only the ﬁnal stages of product development or patent-
ing) may be harming the technical capabilities of innovation systems.10
The conventional narrative on value assumes a public sector that provides basic goods
and then “gets out of the way” of private actors, with innovation an outcome of risk-
hungry capitalists. In this formulation, the exchange between manufacturers and public
health systems is a cost-beneﬁt calculation in which government spending on a new
therapy is weighed against the status-quo alternative (which may be spending on an older
standard of care, or no action). Public action, such as downstream investments in clinical
trials or fair drug pricing contracts for therapies of public health importance, is eschewed
because it “crowds out” the incentives for risk-taking pharmaceutical companies.
Such a picture, in which the public sector operates in a hermetically sealed stage of
an innovation process, is at historical odds with how new advances have unfolded in
health (and other domains). Instead, innovation is the result of dynamic interactions
between public and private actors in what is a cumulative, collective, and uncertain
process (Lazonick and Mazzucato 2013). In this process, rather than crowding out
private actors, public investment has served to “crowd in” private investment; through
long-term risk-taking at technical frontiers – in other words, the public sector has
actively created and shaped markets by creating new opportunities for investment.
Given this crowding-in dynamic, with private ﬁnance often following public invest-
ments, a ﬁrst step is to acknowledge this very dynamic (which is often ignored or
obscured). A second step is to ensure that that such policies have steady funding
streams and not undermined by problematic schemes. A third step is to reward high-
risk public investments. Large pharmaceutical companies often lobby for tax policies
that diminish the capabilities of high-risk public investments. Alongside pushing for tax
inversions, one example of such a policy is the “patent box”, in which companies seek
to reduce taxes on proﬁts from patents. Rather than focusing on increasing proﬁts,
policy-makers should focus on strategies that lead to greater investment along the
innovation chain from both public and private actors. Many of these indirect policies
have only increased proﬁts of pharmaceutical companies, without aﬀecting their invest-
ment patterns. In other words, while public investment can crowd in private ﬁnance,
this conﬁguration can only be sustained if the interactions between the public and
private are structured in strategic and durable ways – a point to which we turn next.
4.3 Distributed: sharing risks and rewards in innovation
Because innovation is a process in which multiple actors take risks for the sake of
uncertain rewards, an analysis of value must also assess the distribution of these risks
and rewards across the process (Lazonick and Mazzucato 2013); in other words, who
takes the risks, and who receives the rewards? This distributive outcome has two critical
consequences for the realization of value in innovation. The ﬁrst is the realization of
directional possibilities for patients and public health. When rewards are skewed to a
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small group of actors, such as shareholders of large companies, the value of therapeutic
advances can be diminished (that is, access restrictions due to high prices) and radical
directions for innovation may be displaced by more risk-averse, incremental routes to
ensure near-term accumulation for those actors. Put simply, maximizing shareholder
value can come to dominate the aim of innovation, rather than maximizing patient and
public health value.
The second consequence relates to the ﬁrst: the very sustainability of the innovation
system to generate value is threatened without an equitable distribution of risks and
rewards. For example, public health systems face the regular crises of providing access
to treatment while balancing opportunity costs in other vital areas of health and social
spending (Reinhardt 2015). Furthermore, public investment in risk-taking science and
technological change can be jeopardized in a system where the companies that beneﬁt
from this risk-taking regularly exercise tax avoidance strategies, while public sector
organizations retain few tools to gain a direct return on the investments in laboratories
and businesses (Pollack 2014). For example, one study estimated that by domiciling
assets (that is, applying patents to approved medicines) in their favored tax haven of
Ireland, US pharmaceutical companies have paid a tax rate of only six percent on over
$100 billion in proﬁts over the past decade (Houlder, Boland, and Politi 2014). This
avoidance threatens the very tax base that funds the scientiﬁc research upon which
further innovation depends.
Alternatively, innovation systems in which risks and rewards are shared can produce
sustainable investments across the process in ways that realize the technical and public
health directions necessary to meet societal challenges. As part of such an innovation
system, a critical question is how the public gets rewarded for value it has co-created,
and how long-termism and deployment of new technologies are eﬀectively rewarded.
Such a distribution of risks and rewards will, in turn, depend on a shift in both the
organizational and policy conﬁgurations towards innovation as well as the prevailing
narrative of value underpinning them.
5. Conclusion: new pathways for value in health innovation
In this paper, we have argued that notions of value in health innovation can be
reimagined by asking three pivotal questions, each of which are promising areas for
research and can, if taken together, provide new horizons for public policy. First, what
are the directions for innovation that can fulﬁll societal needs related to health? Second,
what is the optimal division of innovative labor and sets of dynamic interactions that
will lead to better product development outcomes? Finally, how can risks and rewards
be distributed in a way that sustains the value creation process in health? Ultimately,
because value creation is a collective process, discussions about directions of innovation
and distributions of rewards must also be the subject of proactive public deliberation.
To build a new approach to value in health, the policy process cannot be relegated as
residual to innovation and ﬁxing market failures, and assessments of value cannot be
reduced to value-based pricing. Rather than “value-based pricing” rewarding each
incremental advance with signiﬁcant increases in pricing (with prices in many cases
outpacing the extent of therapeutic advance), value can be re-framed in terms of public
health value, where directions of innovation are aimed at societal health needs. Rather
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than disproportionately rewarding end-stage value-extraction by manufacturers and
their shareholders, value can also be re-imagined in terms of value creation, which
brings to the forefront the long-term public leadership required for innovation. Such a
consideration of value as “public value” should encourage a radical re-thinking of health
innovation as currently conceived, with attempts to both reform the dominant share-
holder model while also experimenting with paradigm-shifting strategies.
How can this be achieved? First, governments can take major steps by shaping mission-
oriented directions for health innovation (Mazzucato 2018). While governments have
made precision medicine and personalized medicine based on genetic advances a major
focus of new mission-oriented strategies in a bid to create new commercial opportunities
while improving health, they have yet to build the bold strategies required across an array of
population-level health challenges (Collins and Varmus 2015). Rather than leaving direc-
tions to be shaped by commercial interests alone, public organizations should take an active
role in deliberating on potential directions. In other words, given that the public actively co-
creates value, what is created should itself be up for public debate. Across many indus-
trialized countries, aging and dementia-related diseases and cancers present major public
health threats. Globally, epidemic disease and growing anti-biotic resistance loom as
challenges that require proactive public investments (Gates 2015; Lowy and Collins
2016). Shaping these directions as purpose-led missions to address major health challenges
can create entirely new technological horizons and attract an array of patient investments
from public and private actors, while also addressing crucial health needs for patients.
Second, alternative ways of organizing and incentivizing innovative labor can spur
this kind of mission-oriented value creation. Rather than enabling ﬁnancial markets to
incentivize the production of more me-too or high-priced drugs, governments can
actively coordinate mission-oriented R&D projects and portfolios through de-centra-
lized networks of public and private partners. Financing for such an approach would
combine grants, milestone prizes, and contracts, with rewards focusing on health
beneﬁts rather than patentability (Quigley 2017). For example, prizes could allow the
exchange of ﬁnancial rewards for licensing of a new technology to a generic producer,
thereby bringing the price of new technologies closer to the costs of production rather
than those expected by shareholders in ﬁnancial markets (Love and Hubbard 2009).
The example of product development partnerships such as the Drugs for Neglected
Diseases Initiative (DnDi), as well as innovative government agencies such as DARPA
and BARDA, are examples of such models that can be tested for wider areas of critical
unmet health needs (DnDi 2013). In these cases, the ultimate access to innovations –
and the pricing of these innovations – is aligned in a way that reﬂects the proportionate
upstream investments of the state (as observed in the US military and its development
and procurement strategies). Such a division of labor would reﬂect a mission-oriented
view of innovation, in which the value chain of drug development would be linked up
to the realization of the missions deﬁned through public deliberation. While missions
may be set in a relatively top down way, policy instruments should be chosen to foster
bottom up exploration for creative experimentation in the innovative process.
Third, new strategies for governing the distribution of risks and rewards can encourage
value creation, long-termism, and the diﬀusion and deployment of new technologies while
preventing the kind of rent-seeking and extraction that threatens health innovation and
public health. For example, methods for the public to gain a greater return on their
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investment could include earning royalties from companies in which public funding played
a major role, with these funds used for ﬁnancing future innovation (innovation funds, for
example) (Mazzucato 2013). Another strategy would be for the public to retain a “golden
share” of patents developed with public funding, with patents governed to be weak and
narrow (rather than strong and broad) to spur greater use and innovation (Mazzoleni and
Nelson 1998). Rather than paying for escalating prices, public health systems should pay
prices that reﬂect both public contributions as well as the impacts of new therapies on
public budgets, with the price of new drugs linked to the possibility of universal access for
health systems and patients (Institute for Clinical and Review 2015). Another major shift
would be to change the rules of the game in shareholder-driven, ﬁnancial-market-based
economies so that companies are accountable to multiple stakeholders, including patients
and health systems, rather than only shareholders (Lazonick 2014). Such rule changes (such
as limiting buybacks) would direct proﬁts generated through collective investment to be
reinvested to beneﬁt the public, rather than hoarded or “ﬁnancialized”, as observed through
the cash stockpiles and share buybacks deployed by large pharmaceutical companies.
Each of these three areas provide horizons upon which to search for policy options
and innovation models that focus on value less in terms of cost-beneﬁt analysis alone
and more in terms of the directions, dynamic divisions of labor, and distribution of
risks and rewards for innovation. Mystiﬁcations over value, on the other hand, can lead
to a situation where static assessments come to normalize high prices and incentivize
incremental advances over therapeutic breakthroughs. If value should indeed be the
subject of discussion, as Gilead’s Alton argues, a wider deliberation on value (how it is
created and how the creative process can be directed at achieving public value) is
required, not one based on the illusory assumptions underlying value-based pricing.
Tackling the challenges faced by patients and populations in coming years will hang on
whether we can bring this view of value to fruition.
Notes
1. See Paul and Langreth (2015).
2. Newer biotechnology companies are also concerned with arguments over “value-based pri-
cing” as well, but in a diﬀerent way than the large incumbent ﬁrms. With few exceptions (such
as Genentech), these biotechnology companies are reliant on external capital markets (venture
and equity markets), where questions of value have less to do with setting speciﬁc prices for
approved products (as most of their valuation comes from products still in development
stages), but with the capability to attract ﬁnancing (and valuation) on the basis of potential
“value-based pricing” in the future. This value-based pricing strategy is thus critical for
maintaining valuations, particularly when biotech companies are looking to launch an IPO
or to be bought by larger pharmaceutical companies. While focusing primarily on the value-
based pricing strategies and narratives advanced by large pharmaceutical companies, we make
reference to implications for the biotechnology sector at relevant points in the paper. Further
analysis of biotechnology companies would involve a more extensive elaboration of the kinds
of ﬁnancing necessary for early stage and translational research.
3. Opportunity cost in this situation refers to the gains that investors could make through
other investment strategies (such as the stock market) versus making capital allocations
towards research. Critics point out that these studies include inﬂated opportunity costs of
greater than 9%, thereby leading to larger estimates for research and development (see
Light and Warburton 2011).
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4. Our description of problem #1 is adapted text from Mazzucato (2018).
5. See Mazzucato (2018), Zeller (2008), and Birch (2017) for more in-depth discussions on
the concept of rent and its evolution in economic thinking as well as its function within
science and biomedicine.
6. From this vantage, patents have been understood to facilitate scientiﬁc development, in
which inventions receive monopoly rights for a speciﬁc period of time, only after which
the public can gain full access (that is, generic licensing) to the knowledge protected by the
patent (Grabowski 2002). As Biagoli (2006) has pointed out, patents technically govern a
legal exchange between the consumers and the investors of patent-protected products,
with these transactions conceptualized in the law as a “bargain” or “fair exchange”:
investors’ right to recuperate costs of research and development in exchange for custo-
mers’ access to the inventor’s product.
7. Comprising 4.14 percent of the sample of all companies in the index, pharmaceutical
companies accounted for 7.38 percent of all buybacks, indicating the disproportionate
extent to which this sector has engaged in extractive strategies. See Lazonick et al
(2016).
8. Bozeman and Sarewitz (2005) describe several criteria for identifying public failures that
are relevant to health and the political economy of innovation we have described, such as
imperfect monopoly (monopoly pricing prevents access and is not used to re-invest in
innovation), beneﬁt hoarding (see the levels of buybacks and cash hoarding in the
industry), and threats to fundamental human subsistence (health and life is at stake).
9. Stirling (2009, 2): “The more demanding the innovation challenges like poverty, ill health or
environmental damage, the greater becomes the importance of eﬀective policy. This is not a
question of ‘picking winners’ – an uncertainty-shrouded dilemma which is anyhow equally
shared between public, private, and third sectors. Instead, it is about engaging widely across
society, in order to build the most fruitful conditions for deciding what ‘winning’ evenmeans.”
10. Arora et al.’s (2015) ﬁndings relate to Pisano’s research into the biotechnology sector’s lack
of productivity, in which he described why a dis-integrated model of innovation (with each
organization doing its own part of a process) would fail to solve the kind of complex, non-
modular problems in biomedicine – in Pisano’s (2006) view, long-term collaborations and
integrated organizations would instead be required to confront uncertainty.
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